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1 Introd uction 
Demand for a good is not deterministic but subject to stochastic shocks, that is, demand 
depends on some random variable. These shocks are usually modeled as uncertainty 
about the intercept of demand (as in this paper), the slope of the demand function, but 
more complex configurations are also possible. By doing market research, firms acquire 
information about this random variable. Having good information benefits firms since 
they wiU be able to predict better how large (residual) demand is, and therefore will 
make better production (or price) decisions which will result in higher profits (gross 
of the costs of information acquisition). Market research is also important for social 
welfare, because it allows demand and supply to be matched better. On the other hand, 
too much duplication of costIy research is socially undesirable. 
In most of the relevant literature information acquisition in stochastic oligopoly mar-
kets (and auctions) is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage the players decide 
how much to invest in information acquisition. In the second stage the choices made in 
the first stage become public and further decisions (quantities in oligopoly markets or 
bids in an auction) may therefore depend on these choices. In our view this "observ-
ability" assumption is unrealistic. How should a firm be able to observe the information 
acquisition decisions of its opponents? Disregarding espionage1 , the only possibility 
seems to be that alI firms publicly announce their information acquisition decisions. The 
only way to credibly announce the precision of information might be to make the reports, 
received from the market research agencies, publico However, firms often do not want to 
share their private information. (See e.g. Gal-Or (1985).) Of course, each firm will have 
some conjectures ahout how well informed the competitors are. And in equilibrium (of 
a one-stage game where information is gathered secretly) these beliefs will necessarily 
be confirmed. But this do es not imply that the firm's quantity decision depends on the 
information acquisition decisions of the opponents. 
Given the implausibility of the assumption that information acquisition decisions are 
observable, it is remarkable that the vast majority of the relevant literature has made 
this assumption without giving any justification.2 There could be two reasons for this. 
First, the analysis of the two-stage game seems to be easier since it can be solved by 
backward induction. The second stage game belongs to the class of games with imperfect 
(and asymmetric) information with which one is quite familiar by now. Plugging in the 
payoffs ofthe (unique) equilibria of the second stage games, the total game is reduced to 
one where players only decide how much information to acquire. However, solving the 
reduced game turns out to be not that straightforwaI~d after all. Checking the second 
1 Recall that information acquisition decisions in the two-stage game become publico In particular, 
each firm knows that its competitors know how well informed it is. This would imply that the presence 
of spies is also public knowledge. 
2Informiition acquisition was studied in Cournot markets by Chang and Lee (1992), Daughety and 
Reinganum (1992), Hwang (1993,1995), Li et al. (1987), Ockenfels (1989) and Vives (1988). Matthews 
(1984) and Milgrom (1981) studied information gathering in auctions. Only Matthews did not make 
the observability assumption, while Hwang (1995) stated that it would be desirable to analyze the game 
without this assumption. Hurkens and Vulkan (1995) considered information gathering by potential 
entrants and also criticized the observability assumption. 
1 
order conditions is not an easy task.3 Moreover, explicit solutions could only be obtained 
for the limit case when the number of firms becomes infinite. We show that the one-stage 
game allows for explicit solutions for any number of firms. 
A second reason for assuming observability of the information acquisition decision 
might have been that the authors were led to believe that the results do not depend 
on whether the assumption is made or noto In fact, Ponssard (1979, footnote 3) claims 
the latter to be the case in his oligopoly model where information is learned either 
perfectly or not at aH. A1though most authors did not model information acquisition 
as a binary choice, they may have thought that Ponssard's claim is valid also when the 
precision of information can be chosen from a continuum. However, even in the binary 
case Ponssard's claim is not completely correcto Section 2 contains a counterexample 
in which (for some parameter values) the one-stage game has more equilibria than the 
bvo-stage game. 
\Vhen the precision of information can be chosen from a continuum the difference 
between the out comes of the one and two-stage games is even more clear. \Ve show that 
in finite Cournot markets firms will acquire less information if information is acquired 
secretly. This is the main result of the paper. The intuition is as follows. Firms gather 
information because they want to estimate residual demando Raising the precision of 
information has two direct benefits, which are present in both models of information 
acquisition. It reduces the prediction errors of the intercept of demand and of the signals 
received by the competitors. Hence, both the demand curve and the production levels 
of the competitors can be estimated more accurately. In the two-stage model there is an 
additional benefit. If one firm raises its precision of information (in the first stage) other 
firms will react les s aggressi vely to their own signal (in the second stage). This im plies 
that the competitors' quantities will be predicted more precisely. Since the equilibrium 
level of information precision is found where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, it 
follows that firms invest more in research when they knmv that the competition will 
observe it (and respond to it). 
The aboye argument reveals that in finite Cournot markets more information is ac-
quired in the two-stage than in the one-stage game. This has an immediate consequence 
for policy implications concerning the need for taxes or subsidies on information gath-
ering activities. Namely, policy advice based on the two-stage game will be biased in 
the direction of lower subsidies or higher taxes, compared to policy based on the (in our 
view) more realistic one-stage model. In fact, we show that even the direction of policy 
can be overturned: For some parameter constellations the one-stage game will advocate 
subsidies while the two-stage game will support taxes. 
Since Vives (1988) and Li et al. (1987) were mainly interested in the competitive 
market, viewed as the limit of finite Cournot markets, it is interesting to analyze whether 
in the limit (when the number of firms goes to infinity) this difference disappears. It 
does. This is obvious if the competitive market with a continuum of firms is analysed 
directly: clearly the average precision of information in the market cannot be changed by 
an individual neglegible firmo However, when the competitive model is seen as the limit 
of finite Cournot markets, it is not obvious that both models of information acquisition 
3This required about one page in both Vives (1988) and Li et al. (1987). 
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yield the same results. As argued above, in each finite market firms' quantity decisions 
can be manipulated by a change in precision of information of a single firmo Even though 
the influence is sma11 per opponent, the aggregate reaction of the market on a change 
in precision of information of one individual firm could be substantial also in the'limit. 
That it is not does not justify the use of the two-stage model since most markets are 
finite. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fo11ows. The next section illustrates how impor-
tant the assumption of observable information acquisition can be. VVe show this most 
convincingly in a simple example that is not related to oligopolistic markets. Then we 
show that Ponssard's (1979) claim that the two models of information acquisition are 
equivalent if information is either learned perfectly or not at all is wrong. In Section 3 a 
general model of information acquisition in an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous 
firms (of which Vives (1988), Li et al. (1987) and Hwang (1993) are special cases) is 
presented. 'Ve present our main result that firms acquire les s information when informa-
tion acquisition is not observed. Vle also show that equilibrium payoffs in the one-stage 
game are higher than in the two-stage game. 
Section 4 analyzes the special case of homogeneous oligopoly and reconsiders the 
models of Vives (1988) and Li et al. (1987). 'Ve derive the explicit expression for the 
equilibrium amount of information gathering. Since we know that in the limit as the 
number of firms grows, the difference between secret and observable information acqui-
sition disappears, we reinforce Vives'(1988) result, that competitive markets are second 
best efficient. In finite oligopolistic markets, however, firms may over- or underinvest in 
information acquisition. Conditions are stated under which firms underinvest relative 
to the social optimum. Finally, it is shown that policy implications derived from the 
different models of information acquisition may give qualitatively different results. 
Section 5 concentrates on the special case of heterogeneous duopoly and reconsiders 
the model of Hwang (1993). Again we give the explicit expression for the equilibrium 
amount of information gathered and it is shown that firms wi11 acquire les s information 
when information is acquired secretIy. We compare the comparative statics for the one-
stage game with those obtained by Hwang's (1993) for the two-stage game. In most cases 
the same conclusions are reached: (1) The firm with the higher marginal production cost 
will gather les s information; (2) An increase in initial uncertainty and a deerease in the 
cost of information leads both firms to gather more information, but the firm with the 
higher marginal production cost increases information acquisition more; (3) An increase 
in the marginal production cost of one firm leads to a decrease of information aequisition 
of that firm and to an increase of information aequisition of its rival. However, our 
comparative statics results differ when considering changes in the slope of the demand 
function. This differenee underlines once more the importance of modeling information 
acquisition in the right way. 
Section 6 concludes and discusses some of the other models of information acquisition 
that have employed a two-stage model. 
3 
2 Secret vs. Private Information 
A very simple example (taken from Levine and Ponssard (1977)) illustrates how striking 
the difference between secret and privaté information acquisition can be. Suppose that 
Nature determines which of the two bimatrix games of Fig. 1 is going to be played, 1 or 
II. Game 1 is picked with probability 2/5. 
L R L R 
T 2,4 2,2 T 2,2 2,4 
B 3,1 0,0 B 0,0 3,1 
1 II 
Figure 1. 
On1y p1ayer 2 has the opportunity to 1earn the outcome of the random move. If 
lleither player knows which game is played, both players have a domillant strategy and 
the outcome will be (T,R), yielding an expected payoff of (2,16/5). Hov.:ever, if player 
2 observes which matrix is chosen, he will play L in game 1 and R in game II. If player 
1 knows that player 2 observes the out come of the move of N ature, player 1 will play 
B and the resulting payoff vector will be (3,1). In the two-stage version of the game of 
information acquisition player 2 will choose (commit) not to obtain information, and the 
outcome will be (T,R). In the one-stage version, where information is acquired secretly, 
player 1 cannot condition his action on whether player 2 learned or noto In equilibrium 
player 1 will know that player 2 cannot resist to observe the out come of the random 
move and therefore player 1 will choose B. Secret and private information acquisition 
lead to different outcomes. 
The aboye example is of theoretical interest but do es not have any economic content. 
Hypothetically, it could be that in examples of economic interest the difference between 
private and secret information acquisition is not important. Ponssard (1979) claims this 
to be the case in a linear model of quantity competition with n firms and stochastic 
demando The information acquisition decision is a binary one: one learns the true 
demand or one learns nothing. Ponssard computes the equilibria for each "subgame" 
where k firms are informed and the remaining n-k firms are uninformed. He shows 
that the uninformed firms always choose to produce the same quantity, independent of 
how many firms are informed, and that they always have the same expected payoff. 
This is caused by the fact that the expected quantity produced by an informed firm is 
independent of how many other firms are informed. From this he concludes that " ... 
this theorem makes immaterial whether the acquisition of information is made privately 
or secretIy". However, Ponssard has shown on1y that the incentives for an informed 
firm to deviate from any strategy profile are the same in the two different games, and 
that the incentives to deviate from the all-firms-stay-uninformed strategy profile are the 
4This terminology is borrowed from Levine and Ponssard (1977). 
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same in the two games. But he failed to examine the incentives for uninformed firms to 
deviate from any other strategy profile. The latter incentives do differ in the two games. 
Therefore, the solutions of the two games might not coincide. 
To make the point more clear let us consider a very simple case. Consider a Cüurnot 
duopoly where price is given by p = d - q, where q is the aggregate production and 
where d is stochastic; with equal probability it is high (h) or low (1). Let a = (l + 11,)/2 
denote average demando For convenience also assume that production is costless. Firms 
can learn the true realization of demand at cost c. First consider the two-stage game. 
If both firms learn the true demand they will produce d/3. Expected payoff is therefore 
([2 + h2 )/18 = a2/9 + Var(d)/9. If both firms stay uninformed they will produce a/3 
resulting in an expected profit of a2 /9. If only one firm learns the demand it is a little 
bit more complicated. The uninformed firm will produce a/3. The informed firm will 
produce (d - a/3)/2. (Note that the expected production of the informed firm equals 
a/3.) The expected profits are a2 /9 for the uninformed firm and a2 /9 + Var(d)/4 for 
the informed firmo The pure equilibrium out comes of the two-stage game are therefore: 
(1) if c > c := Var( d)/4 both firms stay uninformed; (2) if c < ~ := V ar( d)/9 both firms 
become informed; (3) if c E (~, c) one firm becomes informed. 
Now consider the one-stage game. Ponssard (1979) already has shown that the incen-
tives to deviate for informed firms are the same. He also has shown that the incentives 
to deviate from the a11-firms-stay-uninformed profiIe are the same. It fo11ows that the 
situation where both firms become informed is an equilibrium outcome of the one-stage 
game if c < ~, and that the situation where both firms stay uninformed is an equiIib-
rium outcome if c > c. But the situation where only one firm becomes informed is an 
equilibrium out come of the one-stage game if c E (e, c), where e:= Var(d)/16. Namely, 
given the fact that the informed firm chooses (d - a/3)/2, the optimal deviatio'n for the 
uninformed firm is to learn demand and produce d/2 - (d - a/3)/4 yielding a profit of 
a2 /9 + Vm·(d)/16. Hence, when the cost ofbecoming informed lies between eand ~ the 
situation of asymmetrically informed firms is an equilibrium outcome of the one-stage 
game but not of the two-stage game. In the two-stage game the uninformed firm would 
deviate and learn the true demando In this case an informed firm prefers the other firm 
to know that it is informed. 
3 The Model 
\Ve will set up a model of information acquisition in Cournot markets which is very 
sin1.ilar to Vives (1988). In fact, the present model wiU be slightly more general such 
that the models of Vives (1988), Li et al. (1987) and Hwang (1993) can be considered 
as special cases. 
There are n 2: 2 firms. The inverse demand function is given by p = () - f3n 2:7=1 Xj, 
where Xj is the output of firm j, f3n > O is a constant and () is a random parameter with 
mean!1 and variance a 2• Firm i has a cost function C¡(X¡) = c¡x¡ + A¡X~, where c¡ 2: O, 
Ai 2: O. Each firm i can buy information of certain precision l/v¡ about demando This 
means that firm i will receive a signal Si = () + 6i where 6¡ is a noise term with zero mean, 
variance V¡ and with C ov( (), 6¡) = O. The signals received by the firms are independent 
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conditional on () and furthermore it is assumed that E(() I Si) is affine in Si. These 
assumptions imply that E(() I Si) = E(Sj I Si) = fl + ti(Si - fl), where ti = a2 /(a2 + Vi). 
Note that as Vi ranges from O to infinity, ti ranges from 1 to O. Instead of working with 
Vi, we shall work with ti and refer to ti as the precision of information. We assume 
that the cost of information acquisition is linear in l/Vi, or equivalently, information of 
precision ti costs 
A typical example of such an affine information structure is for () and Ci to be Normal. 
Si could be the average of ni observations from a Normal distribution with mean () 
and fixed variance. The precision of information l/Vi is proportional to the number of 
observations. \\fhen the marginal cost of an extra observation e is constant, the cost of 
information will be linear in l/Vi. (See Vives (1988) for a description of a number of 
other distributions that define an affine information structure.) 
Let r 1 denote the one-stage game of information acquisition. A strategy for firm i in 
this game is a pail' (ti, Xi(·)), whel'e ti E [0,1) is the choice of pl'ecision and where X¡(·) 
maps pl'ivate signals into quantities. Let r 2 denote the two-stage game. In this game a 
stl'ategy fol' firm i is a pair (ti, Yi(·, .)), whel'e ti again denotes the pl'ecision of information 
and whel'e Yi(t, Si) denotes the quantity produced by i in case it receives signal Si while 
fil'ms have chosen to acquil'e information according to the tuple t = (tI,···, t n ). Let r2(t) 
denote the second stage continuation game of r 2 where precision tuple t was chosen 
in the fil'st stage. It is quite straightforwal'd to solve for the Perfect Bayesian N ash 
equilibrium of r 2 • First one solves for the (unique) Bayesian Nash equilibrium of r2(t), 
for all t. Substitution of the equilibrium payoffs 7ri(t) - C(ti) reduces the two-stage 
game to a game where only precision levels have to be chosen. This gives rise toO reaction 
functions, and the equilibrium level of information is found by computing the intersection 
of these reaction functions, or, if the solution is interior, by equating the marginal \Talue 
of infol'mation with its marginal cost: 
aa
7ri 
= C'(ti) (all i). 
ti 
At first sight it seems that solving r 1 will be more complicated. The precision of 
information ti and the action function Xi(·) have to be chosen simultaneously. Hence, i t 
is not possible to work with reaction functions. However, a first order condition approach 
can be used. In fact, it will turn out that this is easier for the one-stage game than for 
the two-stage game. In particular, an explicit solution for r 1 will be derived whereas 
the solution for r 2 can be given only implicitly. The key observation is that if (t,x) 
is apure Nash equilibrium of r 1 , it must be the case that x is an equilibrium of r2 (t). 
This reduces the number of candidate solutions of r 1 considerably. Only these candidate 
solutions have to be checked against unilateral deviations (t~, xD. 
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The Continuation Came 
As outlined above, the first step in the analysis of both f 1 and f 2, focuses on the 
continuation games f 2 (t). From the previous literature it is known that the equilibrium 
strategies in each continuation game are affine with respect to the signal. Instead of 
proving this here, we will impose that all quantity choice functions are affine. 
Let t = (tI,"', tn) be a tuple of information precisions and consider the continuation 
game f 2 (t). Fix strategies Xj(Sj) = aj(Sj - ¡.¡,) + bj for all j =1- i. The best reply for firm 
i is that function X¡(·) that maximizes conditional expected profit 
Hence, 
where 
X¡(S¡) E(O I Si) - f3n L#¡ E(Xj(Sj) I Si) - C¡ 
2(A¡ + f3n) 
b¡ + a¡t¡(s¡ - ¡.¡,), 
b. _ f1 - Ci - f3n L#i bj 
I - 2(Ai + f3n) 
(1) 
(2) 
The conditional expected payoff (gross of information cost) from responding in this 
optimal way equals (Ai + f3n)(,T¡(Si))2, The unconditional expected profit can now be 
computed to be 
7r¡(t) .- E ((A¡ + f3n)(X¡(S¡))2) 
(A¡ + f3n)([E(X¡(S¡))]2 + VaT(xi(S¡))) 
(A¡ + f3n)(b¡ + a¡t¡((J2 + Vi)) 
(A¡ + f3n)(b¡ + a¡t¡(J2). (3) 
Using (1) and (2) the equilibrium strategies can be computed and written as x¡(s¡) = 
bi + ai[t]t¡( Si - f1), where 
and 
2(A¡ + f3n)b~ = f1 - C¡ - f3n L bj 
#¡ 
2(A¡ + f3n)ai[t] = 1 - f3n L tjaj[t]. 
#i 
(i=l, ... ,n) (4) 
(i = 1, ... ,n) (5) 
Note that the constants bi (i = 1,' .. , n) do not depend on the precision of information 
in the market. 
Lemma 1 Solutions to systems (4) and (5) existo MOTeove1', they a1'e unique. 
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Endogenous Information Acquisition 
The information acquisition games are now easily solved. We consider first the two-
stage game. The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (t*, y*(., .)) of r 2 needs to be such that 
y*(t,·) is the unique Nash equilibrium of r2(t) as computed aboye, for all t. Hence, 
yi(t, Si) = b'¡ + a'f[t]ti(Si - J-l) for all t. Furthermore, no firm must have an incentive to 
gather any different amount of information. Assuming an interior solution this amounts 
to demanding that (o7fd Oti)t- = G'(tn 01' 
P'i + ¡3n)o-2((ai[t*])2 + 2tiailt*](ooai )It*) = G'(ti). 
ti 
(6) 
It is not so easily verified that the second order condition is satisfied, but it can be done. 
(For the special cases of homogeneous firms and of heterogeneous duopoly see Vives 
(1988) and Hwang (1993), respectively.) 
Consider now the one-stage game. In order for (E, i(·)) to be apure equilibrium of 
r 1 , x(·) needs to be the equilibrium of r 2 (l). As before, this strategy profile can be 
computed and written as X¡(S¡) = bi + ai[E]Ei(s¡ - J-l). The additional condition is that 
no firm must have an incentive to deviate f1'om this profile. Note that firms can deviate 
from the information precision and the quantity decision function at the same time. 
However, given a deviation fromi¡ to ti, the optimal deviation from x¡(·) is easily seen to 
be 1:¡( Si) = b'f + aifE]t¡( Si - J-l). This fo11ows from (1) and (2). (Reca11 that the opponents 
do not observe the deviation and stick therefore to their strategies.) Note that ani] 
depends on i, but not on t¡. Assuming an interior solution it fo11ows from (3) that this 
amounts to demanding that 
2(-e[-])2 '(-) p.¡ + ¡3n)o- a i t = G ti . (7) 
Here it is easily verified that the second order condition is satisfied, since G"( ti) > O and 
the left-hand side does not depend on ti. 
Comparing (6) and (7) it becomes obvious that the solutions of the two different 
information acquisition games do not coincide, as long as they are interior. In fact, 
whenever oai[t]/ot¡ > O the solution of the two-stage game will yield higher levels of 
precision than the one-stage game. Indeed, we establish our main result: 
Theorem 1 The equilib1'ium precisions of information in r 1 are strictly smalle1' than 
those in r 2, unless they are zero in both. 
Proof. From the equations (5) corresponding to firms i and j .¡ i we deduce that 
It fo11o\Vs that ant] > O for a11 i in view of (5). Moreover, differentiating with respect to 
ti yields 
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If . I oae[t] < o tI oaj[t] O r 11· .../.. . TI' .. 'bl" It \vere true t lat ~ _ , len ot¡ < ,101' a J I Z. lIS IS lmpossl e m vlew 
of equation (5). Therefore, o~~~t] > O and the result fo11ows from inspection of equations 
(6) and (7). O 
Lemma 2 The equilibrium payoffs of r 2 are strictly lower than those of r 1, unless no 
information is gathered in any of the games. 
P1'00f. See Appendix. 
Lemma 2 provides an argument why firms would not want to play the two-stage game 
even if they could choose to do so. Suppose firms acquire information secretly but sorne 
way exists to credibly inform the other firms of (a 10wer bound on) the precision of one's 
information. Given that each firm enjoys an additional benefit of information acquisition 
if the other firms are informed about the precision of its information, each firm would opt 
for the announcement. In equilibrium firms will acquire the level of information predicted 
by the two-stage game. Lemma 2 shows that the precision announcement game is a type 
of prisoner's dilemma: each firm prefers to gather more information and announce it, 
but when aH firms do that, they are aH worse off. Folk Theorem-type arguments support 
a no-announcement outcome in the infinitely repeated version of this game. Given the 
higher equilibrium payoffs of the one-stage game firms wi11 consciously choose not to 
re ve al the precision of their information. 
4 HOlTIogeneous FirlTIS 
In this section the special case of homogeneous firms will be considered. Let Ai == A aud 
Ci == O for aH í. 5 Given Lemma 1 it suffices to look for symmetric candidate solutions aud 
unilateral deviations thereof. Let i denote a tuple of information precisions where ij = t* 
for a11 j =1- i. Consider the equilibrium x(·) of r 2 (i). From (4) and (5) the equilibriul11 
strategies can be computed. In particular, xi(sd = b'f + ai[i]ii(Si - f1) where 
(8) 
and 
-e[i] 2(A + f3n) - f3n t* 
a
i 
= 2(>. + f3n)(2(>. + f3n) + f3n(n - 2)t*) - f3-;(n - l)t*ii' 
It fo11ows that 
(9) 
aud that 
5The marginal cost parameter C¡ enters only in the constant term of the equilibrium strategies aud 
does, therefore, not affect the results. 
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Substitution of (9) and (10) in (6) and some further manipulations yield that the sym-
metric equilibrium precision of information t* is found by solving M PV;(t*) = C'(t*), 
where 
2 2(A + ¡Jn)(l + (n - 1)-y) + (n -l)-yt¡Jn 
111 Pl-'2(t) = a (A + ¡Jn) (2(A + ¡Jn)(l + (n - l)-y) - (n - 1)-yt¡Jn)3' 
if this solution is nonnegative. In this expression 
Vve use the notation 111 PV2 (t) to denote the marginal private value to a firm of increasing 
its precision when all firms have acquired information of precision t. It is impossible to 
get an explicit solution for t*. Only the limit solution for the case of infinitely many 
firms can be computed after taking the limit of 111 Pl-'2 as n goes to infinity. This limit 
case will be of interest in order to compare our results with Vives (1988) and Li ei al. 
(1987) who focused on this case. 
Consider now the one-stage model. Substitution of (9) into (7) yields that the sym-
metric equilibrium precision of information lis found by solving 111 PVí (l) = C'(l) , where 
as long as this solution is nonnegative. Here 111 PV1 (t) denotes the marginal prívate value 
of information in the one-stage game. Using C/(t) = c/(a2(1- t)2), the aboye express ion 
can be sol ved explicitly to obtain: 
It is easily checked that 111 PV2 (t) - 111 Pl"Í (t) > O for all t > o. To be precise, 
111 PV2(t) - 1'1 PV1 (t) 
a 2(A + ¡Jn) 
The difference is proportional to (and of the same sign as) oa¡foti. (Compare (6) and 
(7).) Hence, t* > E, unless t* = E = O. 
Note, however, that when n tends to infinity 1I1PV2 (·) and 1I1Pll¡(·) converge to the 
same function. Therefore, in the limit the difference between the outcomes of the two 
different information acquisition games disappears. This is independent of whether the 
market is replicated a la Vives (1988) or a la Li et al. (1987). In the model of Li ei al. 
(1987) this result is not surprising. Since in their model ¡Jn = ¡J, which is independent of 
n, demand is not replicated when the number of firms grows. When n goes to infinity, the 
gros s profits per firm go to zero. Therefore, the amount of money spent on research has 
to go to zero. In the model of Vives (1988) where demand is replicated since ¡Jn = ¡J In 
the result is not at all obvious. In this case private information acquisition information 
has an additional benefit. If one firm raises its precision of information other firms will 
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react less aggressively to their own signal. Therefore competitors' quantities will be 
predicted more precisely. This implies that in each finite Cournot market firms' quantity 
decisions can be manipulated by one sip-gle firm changing its information acqui~ition. 
When the number of firms grows, the infiuence per opponent diminishes. Howevei-, it is 
not obvious that the aggregate of these small infiuences is not substantial. 
Note also that M PV;(O) = 1\1 PVi (O) and that 1\1 PV;(O) = M PV{(O). This implies 
that when the equilibrium amounts of information acquisition are close to zero (because 
information gathering is very costly or because initial uncertainty is quite small), then 
the two models predict approximately the same levels of information acquisition. For 
low information cost and high initial uncertainty the models will, however, predict very 
different levels of information gathering. 
ll1elfare 
Firms gather information in order to estimate residual demand and make higher 
profits. Consumers also benefit from the fact that demand and supply are matched 
better. \iVhen firms receive imprecise signals, sorne firms will overestimate demand while 
others will underestimate it. As a result firms will produce different quantities and, since 
production costs are convex, they will produce at different marginal costs, which clearly 
indicates an inefficiency. Bette1' info1'mation reduces this inefficiency. On the other hand, 
a fi1'm gathering information imposes a negative externality on its rivals. It raises its 
profits at the expense of the other firms. At high levels of information acquisition this 
10we1's total industry profit. The duplication of market resea1'ch by many fi1'ms also has 
a negative effect on social welfare. 
The welfare aspects of information acquisition are therefore not clear and need to be 
examined. \iVe need to define the efficient leve! of information and examine which policy 
measures are needed in order to obtain this optimal level. Since firms acquire more 
information in the two-stage game than in the one-stage game, policy implications are 
likely to differ with the model we use. Moreover, if our claim that the one-stage game is 
more 1'ealistic is true, it is important to understand how wrong policies based on the two-
stage game would be. Will policy implications be reversed, i.e. will the two-stage model 
recommend to tax (subsidize) information acquisition when it ought to be subsidized 
(taxed)? Or will it advocate a different magnitude of the same policy direction? 
To address this issue three different definitions for the best (efficient) level of infor-
mation will be examined that are characterized by a trade-off between efficiency and 
feasi bili ty. 
Def. 1 The first best (efficient) level of information is that level of information 
acquisition that maximizes welfare when firms use welfare maximizing quantities in pro-
dudion and the information of all firms can be pooled. 
Vives (1988) has shown that (with strictIy convex cost functions) the competitive 
market cannot attain the first best level of information, unless the cost of information is 
zero. There are simply no strategies that could yield the first best out come , since convex 
costs imply that firms will surely operate at different marginal costs if they are to rely 
on their own private signal. \iVith constant marginal cost, however, first best efficiency 
is possible. This result is opposed to the one of Li et al. (1987). The difference of results 
11 
is caused by the fact that Li et al. (1987) do not replicate the market appropriately. 
Therefore, from now on we will only consider the properly replicated market, that is 
f3n = f3 In. 
The assumption that the information of all firms can be pooled is unrealistic. It do es 
not respect the decentralized decision structure of the economy. Efficiency of competitive 
markets is restored if the constraint of decentralized information acquisition is recognized. 
Def. 2 The second best (efficient) level of information is that level 01 inlormation 
acquisition that maximizes we!fare when firms use we!fare maximizing quantity functions 
in production while inf01'mation cannot be pooled. 
Vives (1988) has shown that the competitive market attains this second best level. 
Since in the limit case firms acquire the same amount of information in the one-stage 
game of information acquisition as in the two-stage game, we get the following corollary 
to Vives' result: 
Corollary 1 When the number of finns goes lo infinity, the one-stage game model of 
information acquisition yields the second best efficient leve! of information. 
The second best efficient level of welfare is problematic because it is based on firms 
maximizing welfare in production. It thereby implicitIy assumes either a policy measure 
in the form of subsidizing production that induces firms to do so, 01' perfect competition. 
A subsidy on production is hard to implement since the size of the correct subsidy 
depends on the pool of information. The alternative implicit assumption of perfect 
competition makes the criterion inapplicable to finite oligopolistic markets. In perfectly 
competitive markets the second best efficient level of information coincides with the 
following criterion: 
Def. 3 The third best (efficient) level of information is that leve! of information 
acquisdl~on that maXl~múes welfare when firms use profit maximizing quantity functions 
in their production decision and inf01'mation cannot be po oled. 
Given that the third best efficient level of information respects the market structure 
in both information acquisition and production it seems the appropriate criterion to be 
used for policy recommendations. The first best level is irrelevant since firms can never 
be given incentives to pool their information. (See Gal-Or (1985).) Moreover, like the 
second best level it assumes some policy measure that ensures welfare maximization 
in production. Only the third measure concentrates on the pure effects of information 
acquisition and wiU therefore be the basis for our welfare analysis. 
For given precision of information t for each firm, each firm j will use the equilibrium 
strategy Xj(Sj) = a(sj - fl) + bfl where a and b are determined by equations (8) and (9), 
respectively. Total welfare (gross of information cost) for given t, () and signals Sj equals 
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We can compute the expected total welfare, ErW(t) by first taking the expectation 
over signals conditional on e, and then taking the expectation over e. The third best 
efficient level t e3 satisfies ETW'(te3 ) = nG'(te3 ), or equivalentIy, 
where Al SV(t) = ETlV'(t)/n denotes the per capita marginal social value of information. 
This is equal to the marginal effect on total welfare when one firm increases its precision, 
when all firms have precision t. In the appendix we show that 
\\Te are now ready to compare the efficient level with the equilibrium level of informa-
tion acquisition. Recall that at the equilibrium marginal private value equals marginal 
cost, while at the third best efficient level of information, the (per capita) marginal so-
cial value equals marginal cost. \\Thether under- 01' overinvestment takes place depends 
therefore on the relative positions of the curves G', 1I1SV, and lv1 PV1 (for the one-stage 
game) and 111 Pl;; (for the two-stage game). We already know that M PV1 líes below 
1\1 PV2 from Theorem 1. The following lemma shows how the relative positions of the 
other curves exactly depend on the parameters of the model. 
Lemma 3 
(i) 1\1SV(t) > 1\IPV1(t) if and only iji < tI, where tI = 2+~~~/t3. tI < 1 if and only ij 
n(l - 2)..//3) > 3. 
(ii) 111 SV (i) > 111 Pl;; (t) ij and only if t < t2 , whel'e t2 is the positive 1'00t of 
[(n -1)(2n)..l/3 + 3/2)]t2 + [n(n)..l/3 + l)]t - 2(n)..l/3 + 1)2 = o. 
t2 < 1 ij and only (4(>"1/3)2 - 6>"1(3)n2 + (12)''1/3 - 5)n + 72: o. 
P1'00f. See Appendix. o 
Lemma 3 tells us that the MSV and MPV curve intersect in a point t which depends on 
>"1/3 and n. For t < t, 111 SV(t) > 111 PV(t) and for t > t the reverse holds. The reason 
is as follows. At low levels of information acquisition sorne firms under- and others 
overestimate demand considerably. This means that they will choose very different 
production levels, and since costs are convex, they will produce at different marginal 
costs, which indicates an inefficiency. (The inefficiency increases with >"1/3.) Moreover, 
at low levels of information precision the negative externality that firms inflict on each 
other is smaller than at high levels. The marginal social value at low (high) levels of t is 
therefore relatively high (low) compared to the marginal private value. 
Note t.hat tI 2:: 1 when )..1/3 2:: 1/2 and that t2 2:: 1 when >"//3 2:: 3/2. Hence, 
when the inefficiency caused by firms producing at different marginal costs is high, the 
marginal social value is larger than the marginal private value, and as a consequence 
firms underinvest. This is true, whatever the size of the market, the cost of information 
gathering and the initial uncertainty. In this case subsidies on information acquisition 
activities could improve welfare. Note that the one-stage game model advocates higher 
subsidies than the two-stage model. 
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When the inefficiency caused by firms producing at different marginal costs is not 
severe (>"//3 is low), then for sufficiently large markets the intersection point of the 
marginal social value curve and the marginal private value curve líes within the interval 
(O, 1). Vlhether firms over- 01' underinvest now depends on the ini tial uncertainty and 
the cost of information acquisition. To be precise, it depends on the ratio (74/ c. (See 
Lemma 7 in the Appendix.) Fig. 2 illustrates the three possible cases. 
\,yhen information is cheap and initial uncertainty relatively large (see curve C~ in Fig. 
2), firms will overinvest. Taxes on information acquisition activities could restore this. 
(Note that the one-stage game calls for lower taxes than the two-stage model.) Vlhen 
information is expensive and initial uncertainty small (curve Cn, firms will underinvest 
relative to the optimum: subsidies are in order. (The one-stage game model calls for 
higher subsidies than the two-stage model.) Note that for intermediate values of the 
ratio el (74 the one-stage game predicts underinvestment and calls for subsidies, while the 
two-stage game model predicts overinvestment and advocates taxes. (Curve C~.) 
c~ 
--- ........................................ ····················11PV 2 
~h:::l 
t 
O 1 
Figure 2: Comparing marginal cost and marginal values. 
Note that (72 appears both in 1\1SV(t) and in 1\1 PV(t) as a factor. Higher initial 
uncertainty amplifies the difference between the social and the private value, while it 
lowers and flattens C'(t). This means that for high initial uncertainty overinvestment 
will occur and that the introduction of the right tax could make up for a substantial 
welfare improvement. In this case the two different models of information acquisition 
would advocate very different tax levels and it is therefore important to use the relevant 
model. \Vhen initial uncertainty is ver y small, on the other hand, a small subsidy would 
be needed. The weIfare improvement would not be very substantial in this case, and also 
the two different models of information acquisition would not yield very different policy 
recommendations. 
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The aboye results show how the different parameters determine whether over- or 
underinvestment occurs. They also show that the two-stage model either advocates too 
low subsidies, too high taxes or a tax instead of a subsidy. In sorne circumstances the 
degree of over- or underinvestment is very small, in which case it does not really matter 
which model of information acquisition is used. This happens when (3 -+ O, (72 -+ O or 
n -+ oo. For (3 -+ 00, A -+ 00 01' C -+ 00 it is optimal not to acquire infol'mation and 
no policy measure is needed. In all other cases introducing the right policy measure can 
account fol' a substantial welfare improvement. In those cases it is important to use the 
right model, especially when initial uncertainty is large. 
5 Heterogeneous Duopoly 
For the case of heterogenous duopoly the general model of section 3 reduces to the 
model of Hwang (1993). We will show that the one-stage game admits an explicit 
solution whereas the two-stage game can only be solved implicitly. Moreover, we will 
show that the comparative statics results obtained by Hwang do not always coincide 
with the results we obtain for the one-stage game. 
Let n = 2 and write (32 = (3. Let t = (ti, tj) be a pair of information precisions. The 
equilibrium strategies of the continuation game r 2( t) can be computed using (4) and (5). 
These computations show that 
where 
Differentiating (12) yields 
4(A¡ + (3)(Aj + (3) - (32t¡tj 
2(Aj + (3)(/1- cd - (3(/1 - Cj) 
4(Ai + (3)(Aj + (3) - (32 
(12) 
(13) 
Substituting (13) into (6) and assuming interior solutions one finds that the information 
precisions of the two-stage game ti (i = 1,2) satisfy ~i(t*) = G'(ti) (i = 1,2) whel'e 
(14) 
",here 
<Pj = 2(Aj + (3) - (3tj and 'ljJ = 4(A¡ + (3)(Aj + (3) - (32t¡tj. 
As \Vas the case for homogeneous firms, it is impossible to get explicit solutions for tr: 
(k = 1,2). It is even impossible to compute the reaction function explicitly. Using the 
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implicit function theorem one can prove that the reaction functions must be monotone 
decreasing. (See Hwang (1993).) Note that for ti < 1 
(1 - t;)2 G'(tn (Ai + (3)(2(Aj + (3) - {3t;)2 
(1 - tiF = G'(t;) - (Aj + (3)(2(Ai + (3) - {3tiF' (15) 
After taking square roots and defining Pk = JAk + (3, (15) can be rewritten as t; = Ej( tn 
where 
E}(td := 2PiPj(Pi - Pj) + tiPj(2piPj - (3) 
Pi(2piPj - (3) + ti{3(Pi - pj) 
is defined for all ti E [0,1]. V-le call the curve defined by (16) the equilíbrium curve. 
(16) 
The solution of the one-stage game is obtained by substituting (12) into (7). Some 
manipulations yield that the (interior) equilibrium precisions ti (i = 1,2) satisfy Lii(t) = 
G'(td (i = 1,2) where 
Lii( t) = (J2( Ai + (3) :~. (17) 
Note that (1 - tj)2 G'(ti) (Ai + (3)(2(Aj + (3) - {3tj)2 
(1 - td2 - G'(tj) - (Aj + (3)(2(Ai + (3) - {3tiF' ( 18) 
Hence tj = Ej (ti). The solutions of the two different games of information acquisition 
líe on the same equilibrium curve. It is easily seen that for t1t2 > O 6i(t) > Lii(t) and 
that, therefore, ti > ti for i = 1,2 whenever the solutions are interior. 
From (17) we obtain 
which can be rewritten as 
Since vve are interested in the case where ti, t j :::; 1 vve have tj = Rj(td where 
(19) 
is defined for ti E [O, (J2pd({3vc + (J2Pi)). V/e will refer to Rj as firm j's pseudo reaction 
curve. It is of course not really a reaction curve because a strategy for cach firm is a pair 
(t,x(·)) where t is the precision of information and where x(·) is a mapping that assigns 
to each signal a quantity. Still, the equilibrium values ti and tj are found by computing 
the intersection point of the pseudo reaction curves, or alternatively, by computing the 
intersection point of Rj and Ej. 
Note that Rj is dovvmvard sloping and has a vertical asymptote, while Ej is upward 
sloping. \V'ithout loss of generality we may assume that Ai 2': Aj which implies that 
Ej(O) 2': O. The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique and 
interior solution is therefore Rj(O) > Ej(O). Hence, 
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Lemma 4 Suppose Ai ~ Aj. The sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of 
a unique interior equilibrium is 
P1'00f Straightforward calculations. o 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, we can explicitIy compute it by computing 
the intersection of the equilibrium curve and the pseudo reaction curve. We obtain 
Lemma 5 SupIJose the equilibrium levels of infoTmation acquisition are strictly positive. 
Then 
P1'00f Straightforward calculations. o 
\Ve will use the equilibrium curve and the pseudo reaction curves to obtain some 
comparative statics results, and will compare them to those obtained by Hwang (1993) 
for the two-stage game. 
Lemma 6 Let Ai > A j . 
(i) Ej (ti) is incTeasing and concave and has slope smalleT than 1 
(ii) Ej (ti) is independent of e and (J2. 
(ííí) Rj(t¡) is dec1'easing. 
(iv) Rj(t¡) shifts dO'l.vnwa7'd when e 01' A¡ incTease and when Aj 01' (J2 dec1'ease. 
(v) R(tj) shifts downward when Ai decreasesand when Aj incl'eases. 
(vi) Rj(t¡) shifts downwa1'd when j3 increases. 
(vii) The equilib1'ium curve Ej(t) shifts downwa1'd when j3 inc1'eases. 
Proof See Appendix. 
Lemma 6 allows us to draw the following conclusions: 
1. From the fact that Ej is concave, Ej(O) ~ O, and Ej(1) = 1 it fo11ows that tj ~ ti 
where equality holds if and only if Ai = Aj. That is, the firm with the lower slope 
of the marginal cost function will acquire more information. 
2. As the pseudo reaction curve shifts upwards when (J2 increases and downwards 
when e increases while the equilibrium curve is unaffected by these parameters, 
an increase in initial uncertainty (J2 or a decrease in information gathering cost e 
leads both firms to gather more information. Since Ej is con cave and Ej(O) :::; 1 
\Ve have Ej(ti) :::; 1 with equality only in the case of identical firms. We may now 
conclude that firm i (recall Ai ~ Aj) increases information acquisition more than 
firm j when initial uncertainty increases or information gathering cost decreases, 
both in absolute terms and in relative terms. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 
3. 
17 
t· J 
1 E· 
1 
Figure 3: effect of increase in 0"2 or decrease in e 
3. As Ai increases, Rj shifts downward and Ri upward. Since R is fiatter than R/, 
ti de creases and tj increases which is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
6This fo11ows from the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a unique interior equi-
librium (Lemma 4). 
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t· J 
1 
1 t. 
I 
Figure 4: An increase in Ai shifts Ri up and Rj down. 
4. Similarly, an increase in Aj leads to an increase in ti and a decrease in tj. 
5. How is the information acquisition affected when f3 increases? Rj shifts downward 
when f3 increases. The equilibrium curve Ej(t) shifts downward when f3 increases 
(for t E [0,1] and when Ai > Aj). It fo11ows that an increase in f3 results in a 
de crease in t j. From the direction of movements of the curves alone, however, the 
effect on ti cannot be determined. It will depend on the relative movements of the 
curves. Fig. 5 illustrates the two possible effects. 
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Fig. 5a: t, increases when f3 increases 
1 
t· J 
Fig. 5b: ti decreases when f3 increases 
Figure 5: An increase of ¡J has ambiguous effects 
In order to determine the effect on ti we need to use the exact expression for ti 
presented in Lemma 5. It turns out that we can find parameter values that show that 
the effect of an increase in ¡J on ti is indeed ambiguous í . This is in sharp contrast 
with the comparative statics results of Hwang's two-stage model, where an increase in 
¡J unambiguously leads to a decrease in ti. Thus besides yielding different levels of 
information acquisitions, which in contrast to Hwang can be calculated explicitIy, the 
one-stage model differs from the two-stage model in the case of heterogeneous duopoly 
in the way firms adjust to a change in ¡J. This difference underlines the importance of 
the way in which information acquisition is modeled. 
6 Conclusions 
In an oligopoly mar1..et with uncertain demand firms acquire information in order to 
estimate (residual) demando When information acquisition is modeled as a two-stage 
game, as has been customary, there is an additional but unrealistic benefit to obtaining 
information. If one firm is 1..nown to have good information, other firms will act les s 
aggressively towards their own private information and this makes their behavior easier to 
predict. In these two-stage models firms therefore overinvest in market research relative 
to the case of secret information acquisition. It was shown, that this overinvestment 
íFo1' example keeping (12 = 1, .¡c = 0.001979, A¡ = 15796.4, Aj = 0.001 and changing f3 [1'om 1 to 
3000 ,,"ill lead to an inc1'ease of ti f1'om 0.01 to 0.112, while increasing f3 further to 9000 wiII cause a 
drop in ti to 0.102. 
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vanishes when the number of firms becomes very large. This implies that in a very 
competitive market the second (third) best efficient level of information is acquired. 
In smaller markets firms may under- or overinvest with respect to the efficient level 
of information acquisition. Policy implications depend always quantitatively on \vhich 
model of information acquisition is considered. In sorne instances the policies advocated 
by the two models are even qualitatively different (tax versus subsidy). Using the "right" 
model is therefore important. 
In this papel' it was argued that the one-stage game is the more relevant model since 
firms are not able to observe the information acquisition decisions of their opponents. The 
two-stage game would be appropriate if firms could credibly commit to (a lower bound 
on) the precision of information and would deliberately chose to do so. However, Lemma 
2 showed that firms are better off not announcing (a lower bound on) the precision of 
their information. 
This papel' reconsidered the models of Ponssard (1979), Li et al. (1987), Vives (1988) 
and Hwang (1993) in detail. There are sorne other models of information acquisition 
that have not been discussed yet. Ockenfels (1989) considers a model very similar to the 
one of Ponssard (1979). The only difference is that in Ockenfels' model quantity choices 
are discrete (in fact binary). It is clear that his model exhibits the same problem as 
Ponssard (1979). 
Chang and Lee (1992) discuss a model of differentiated duopoly which did not fit nicely 
in the model presented in section 3, although the present model could be extended to 
include differentiated products as well. Again information acquisition is modeled as a 
two-stage game. It can be easily verified by computing the best reply against an affine 
strategy, as was done in section 3, that also in their model firms overinvest in research 
relative to the case of secret information acquisition. 
Hwang (1995) considers a model of information acquisition that is designed to com-
pare monopoly, duol~oly, and competitive markets. There are only two players in the 
model. The second stage game is modeled using conjectural variations. By varying 
the conjectural variations the model can represent monopoly, duopoly 01' a competitive 
market. However, in the first stage there are no conjectural variations. Hence, the influ-
ence of raising the precision of information are more or less the same as in the ordinary 
duopoly game. This means that firms overinvest in research in Hwang's (1995) model 
even in the case of a competitive market. The peculiarity of this model is further illus-
trated by Lemma 4 in Hwang (1995). It says that the level of information precision that 
maximizes joint profit is smaller than the equilibrium precision. The Lemma is mathe-
matically correct, but does not make any sense in the case the model is to represent a 
monopoly. 
Further models of information acquisition have been studied for auctions. Milgrom 
(1981) considers a two-stage version whereas Matthews (1984) considers the one-stage 
version. Unfortunately Matthews (1984) was unable to get an explicit solution. Further 
research has to be conducted for the case of auctions. One should note, though, that 
the main interest in the literature on information acquisition in auctions is when the 
llumber of bidders becomes very large. The question addressed is whether the winning 
bid will converge (with probability one) to the true value of the object. Because of 
the similarity with competitive markets one might conjecture that it does not matter 
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whether information is acquired secretly or noto However, this needs to be examined 
carefully. 
7 Appendix 
7.1 Existence of equilibriulll 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Let A denote the n X n matrix with entries Ai = 2(.-\i + (Jn) (i = 1, ... , n) and 
Aj = f3n t j (i -=1 j). Existence and uniqueness of solutions for equations (4) and (5) 
is equivalent to showing that A is non-singular. Subtracting the j-th row from the 
j + l-st row (j = n - 1, ... , 1) yields a matrix B with the same determinant as A which 
has zeros everywhere, except in the first row and in the entries (i, j) where i = j > 1 
(Bjj = 2(.-\j + f3n) - f3ntj)or i = j + 1 > 1 (Bj+1,j = f3ntj - 2(.-\j + f3n)). Subtracting 
Bk+1,kj Bk+1,k+1 times the (k + l)-st column from the k-th column (for k = n - 1, ... , 1) 
yields a matrix e with the same determinant as B with zeros everywhere, except in 
the first row and the diagonal. The determinant of e is thus egual to the product of 
its diagonal elements, which is not equal to zero since G ií = Bií > O for i > 1 and 
G11 = A 11 - f3nt2(f3nt1 - 2(.-\1 + f3n))j(2(.-\2 + f3n) - f3nt2) > O, where the last inequality 
follows from the fact that tI t 2 ::; 1 and Al, '-\2, (Jn > o. O 
7.2 Equilibritull payoffs 
Proaf af Lemma 2. 
Recall that t (resp. t*) denote the equilibrium level of information acquisition in the 
one-stage game (resp. two-stage game), and that t < t*. Let a,e[t] = 1/(2(A + f3n) + (n-
l)tf3n) and be = pj(2.-\+ (n+ l)f3n), such that x(s) = bep+a,e[t]t(s -p) is the equilibrium 
strategy of each firm in the second stage game r(t, ... , t). Using (3) we know that the 
equilibrium payoff in this second stage game equals 
The equilibrium payoffs for the one- and two-stage game are therefore 7r(f) - C(f) and 
7r(t*) - G(t*). Now 
7r'(t) - C'(t) 0-2(A + f3) 2(A + f3n) - (n - 1 )f3nt _ C'(t) 
n (2(.-\ + f3n) + (n - l)f3nt )3 
< 1\1 Pll¡ (t) - G'(t) (20) 
where 1\1 PV1(t) is the marginal private value of information acquitision in the one-
stagegame defined by 4. The right-hand side of (20) is negative for t > t. Hence, 
7r(t) - G(t) > 7r(t*) - G(t*). O 
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7.3 The third best level of inforlnation 
Vve assume that the solution is symmetric. For given precision of information t for 
each firm, each firm j will use strategy Xj(Sj) = a(sj - f.l) + bf.l where a and b are the 
equilibrium strategies as computed in Section 4, i.e. 
b = 1/(2)" + (n + l)f'n), 
and 
a = t/(2()" + f'n) + (n - l)f'nt). 
Total welfare, gross of information costs, equals for given precision t and fixed O and 
fixed signals s j 
Expected total welfare, given O equals 
E(TIVIB) = 0
2 1 
2f'n - 2f'n {[E((O - f'n La(sj - f.l) + bf.l)IOW + 
+Var((O - f'nLa(sj - f.l) + bf.l)IO)} + 
-).. L[E(a(sj - f.l) + bf.l10)2 + Var(a(sj - f.l) + bf.lIB)] = 
02 1 ;¡- - -[O - f'nn(a(O - f.l) + bf.lW + ~f'n 2f'n 
- ~ f'~na2v - )..11,( a( B - f.l) + bf.l)2 - )"na2v. 
2fJn 
Taking the expectation over O gives unconditional expected welfare 
ETH1(t) = f.l2 + (J2 1 2f'n - 2f'n (f.l - f'nn( a(f.l - f.l) + bf.l))2 + 
1 ( )2 2 
- 2f'n 1 - f'n 1w (J + 
1 
-2f'nna2v - )"na2(J2 - )..n(bf.l)2 - )"na2v. 
At the optimal level of information acquisition, te3 , we have ETIV'(t e3 ) 
Define the (per capita) marginal social value of information as 
l\lSV(t) = ETIV'(t)/n. 
Now it is straightforward to check that 
l\fSlI(t) = a'(J2 - nf3naa'(J2 - f'naa'v - f'na2v'/2 
-2)"aa'(J2 - 2)..aa'v - )"a2v' 
2 2)..2 + 31'; + 5f'n).. + )"(n - l)tf'n + (n - 1)tf';/2 (J . (2().. + f3n) + (n - 1)tf3n)3 
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7.4 Welfare allalysis 
PTOof of Lemma 3. 
(i) It is easily verified that 1\1 SV (t) > M PV1 (t) if and only if 
A{3n + {3~ - (n - l)t{3; > O. 
2 
In particular, .MSV(O) > 1\1PV1(0). Furthermore, the two curves intersect at tI 
2(nA/{3 + l)/(n - 1). tI ::; 1 if and only if n(l- 2A/(3) ~ 3. Obviously, when 2A/{3 ~ 1, 
no n exists for which the inequality holds. On the other hand, if 2A/ (3 < 1, the inequality 
holds for large enough n. 
(ii) It is easily verified that 1\1SV(t) > 1\1 Pl;;(t) if and only if 
In particular, 1\1SV(0) > M PV2 (0). Furthermore, the two curves intersect only once 
in the halfline [0,(0), namely in [2, the positive root of the equation mentioned in the 
statement of the Lemma. 
_ (nA/{3 + l)(-n + Jn2 + 8(n -1)(2nA/{3 + 3/2)) 
t 2 = ------------~----------------------2(n - 1)(2nA/{J + 3/2) 
This intersection point lies in the interval [0,1] only if the left-hand side of the aboye 
inequality, evaluated at t = 1, is positive, i.e. if 
(n -1)(6nA/{3 + 5) ~ 2(nA/{J + 1)(2nA/{3 + 1). 
This is equivalent to 
Obviously, when A/ {J ~ 3/2, there exists no n > O for which the aboye inequality holds. 
If A/ {3 < 3/2, for large enough n the inequality is satisfied. O 
Lemma 7 
(i) Suppose that A, {3 and n a1'e such that tI < 1, i.e. the marginal social value curve 
intersects the marginal private value curve in the inte1'val (0,1). Then the1'e exists some 
t1'eshold Xl (which depends on A, (3 and n) such that ove1'investment occurs if and only 
lfcr4/c> Xl' 
(ií) Suppose that >., (J and n are such that t2 < 1, i. e. the marginal social value C1l1"ve 
intersects the marginal prívate value curve in the interval (0,1). Then there exists so me 
ireshold :r2 (which depends on A, f3 and n) such that overinvestment occurs if and only 
ifcr4/c>x2' 
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Proof: (i) Suppose that AI SV and 111 Pll¡ intersect in tI < 1. Overinvestment occurs 
when t> tI or, equiva1ent1y, when M PV¡ (tI) > C'(t¡). Hence, overinvestment occurs if 
and on1y if 
0-4 111 PV¡ (t ¡) 
-> A. 
e 0-2(1 - t¡)2 
The right-hand side depends on1y on n, 13, and A. Call it Xl. Now overinvestment occurs 
if and only if 0-4 / e> Xl. 
The proof of (ii) goes a10ng the same lines. O 
7.5 C0111parative statics 
Proof of Lemma 6 
(i) 
E'( .) _ PiPj (13
2 + 2pt(p; - (3) + 2p;(p; - (3)) O 
t z - ) ( )) >. J (Pi(2p¡pj - 13 + tif3 Pi - pj 2 
From (21) it easily fo11o\\'s that Ej'(t¡) < O and, hence, Ej(t¡) :::; Ej(O) < 1. 
(ii) Trivial. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
aRj(t¡) -2(1 - t¡)f3p¡p;(2p; - t¡(3) O 
---,--"-'=-'- - < 
aJC - [t¡f32JC - f30-2p¡(1 - t¡)]2 . 
aRj(t¡) 2f3p;JC [4p¡t¡f3JC - 2P7o-2(1 - ti) - 0-2(1 - t¡)t¡f31 
--,"-'---'- = < O 
ap¡ [t¡f32JC - f30-2p¡(1 - t¡)]2 . 
(21 ) 
The inequa1ity fo11ows from 0-2(1-t¡) 2:: 2PiJC (on the re1evant range, i.e. where Rj(i¡) 2:: 
O). 
To see that Rj(t¡) increases with increases in Aj note that Rj(t¡) can be written as 
the product of p; and a factor that does not depend on Aj. 
Finally, 
(v) As (iv). 
(vi) Rj(t) is the product of two positive factors (at least on the relevant range) which 
are both decreasing in 13. N amely, 
and 
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while 
8 (a2Pi (1 - t) - 2P~VC) 
8{3 a2Pi(1 - t) - t{3vc = 
-a2(1 - t)2piVC - a2(1 - t)t{3-Jcj(2Pi) - 2(p; - (3)tc O 
(a2Pi(1 - t) - t{3-Jc)2 < . 
(vii) Note that (8j8{3)(Pk) = 1j(2pk). It can be verified that 
. (8Ej (t))_ 
slgn 8{3 -
sign {(Pi - Pj) [pj (pi - Pj )t{3 + P; (2piPj - (3) + Pi (pi - Pj )t{3+ 
Pi pj pj 
-Pi(2piPj - (3) + t(2piPj - {3?p~ + pj + t2: (2piPj - (3) + 
~PiPj ~Pj 
e{3pj(Pj + Pi - 1) - 2PiPj(Pi - pj)t - t2pj(2p¡pj - (3) + 
Pi pj 
t2.L(2PiPj - (3) - 2p;pj(Pj + Pi - 1)]} 
2Pi Pi pj 
\Ve may now multiply the term between the square brackets by 2PiPj and write it as 
a quadratic expression in t. Note that Ej (l) = 1 so that the express ion between brackets 
equals zero for t = 1. Using that Ai > Aj we find that 
if and only if 
(t-1)(At+B)<0 
where, 
and 
B = 2pr{3 - 2PTPj{3 + 4PTPj. 
The statement (vii) follows now from the observation that B > O and that if A < O then 
-B/A> 1. O 
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